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ABSTRACT
Consensus algorithms provide strategies to solve problems in a
distributed system with the added constraint that data can only
be shared between adjacent computing nodes. We Vnd these algo-
rithms in applications for wireless and sensor networks, spectrum
sensing for cognitive radio, even for some IoT services. How-
ever, consensus-based applications are not resilient to compro-
mised nodes sending falsiVed data to their neighbors, i.e. they can
be the target of Byzantine attacks. Several solutions have been
proposed in the literature inspired from reputation based systems,
outlier detection or model-based fault detection techniques in pro-
cess control. We have reviewed some of these solutions, and pro-
pose two mitigation techniques to protect the consensus-based
Network Intrusion Detection System in [1]. We analyze several
implementation issues such as computational overhead, Vne tun-
ing of the solution parameters, impacts on the convergence of the
consensus phase, accuracy of the intrusion detection system.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→ Intrusion detection systems;Mobile
and wireless security; Denial-of-service attacks;
Keywords
Network Security; Distributed Average Consensus; Byzantine At-
tacks
1. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of ubiquitous computing on IP-based networks,
the research on appropriate techniques to uncover yet unknown
network misuse patterns and malware gained a great deal of in-
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terest. While a wide range of diUerent systems has been imple-
mented, many of these are centralized and show a single point
of failure. The distributed nature of todays communication net-
works substantiate the desire to employ peer-to-peer information
exchange in order to reach a global decision.
In consensus based application schemes, each peer communi-
cates only with its neighbors and updates its own state accord-
ing to an update rule and local weighting. However, since the
update rules are not resilient against malicious peers sending in-
correct data, the cooperative and fully distributed natures of those
systems expose a high vulnerability to falsiVcation (Byzantine) at-
tacks [2]. DiUerent strategies have been proposed in the literature
to address this issue based either on reputation systems [3], out-
lier detection [4], or model based fault detection techniques [5].
All these strategies have in common that each node acts as an
observer of its neighbors and makes a local determination on to
whether a neighbor is a compromised node.
The major contributions of this paper include presenting the
impact of malicious peers on the detection capability of our con-
sensus based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) scheme
[1]. We analyze the vulnerabilities of consensus-based NIDS by
proposing data falsiVcation attacks, which aim to adjust and steal-
thily manipulate results. Moreover, we have implemented two
defense strategies to protect the NIDS systems against a single at-
tacker. We compare these strategies under various detection pa-
rameters and network topologies through extensive simulations
and analysis using a real IDS and the NSL-KDD data set [6].
In the remainder, we present an overview of distributed peer-
to-peer NIDS and consensus algorithms as well as related liter-
ature. Next we discuss the peculiarities of our consensus-based
NIDS. We point out variations of falsiVcation attacks and outline
two mitigation techniques to adjust the trustworthiness of par-
ticipating peers. Thereafter, we illustrate the salient features of
our prediction model to identify Byzantine peers and describe a
practical experiment we conducted to showcase its functionality.
Our results demonstrate that, the conducted method can indeed
unveil peers with malicious intend and disruptions in the infor-
mation exchange of peer-to-peer NIDS.
2. RELATED WORK
Constructing accurate network traXc models with the objec-
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Figure 1: Network Intrusion Detection System.
tive to discover yet unknown malicious network traXc patterns
is, after the initial publication of Dorothy Denning [7] and the im-
plementation of today’s productively used systems such as Snor-
tAD [8] and PHAD [9], still a popular Veld of research. Methods to
subvert these systems, such as utilizing sophisticated covert chan-
nels [10] or mechanisms to compromise the Intrusion Detection
System itself [11] in order to prevent the detection of malicious
activities, have been proposed to the same extent.
A common mitigation for above mentioned risks is to avoid
a single point of failure by using distributed Intrusion Detection
Systems. Todays alternative to early systems [12,13], which build
upon a master–slave architecture and require the data to be sent
to a central location for analysis, are peer-to-peer systems [14,15]
that recognize attacks in a distributed manner.
Consensus algorithms have a long history in the Velds of dis-
tributed computing and control theory starting the the work of
Degroot [16], Chatterjee and Seneta [17] as well as Fisher, Lynch
and Paterson [18]. These initial works have found applications
to problems in control theory [19], operations research [20] as
well as in engineering. One particular domain of applications
concerns information fusion in distributed systems such as co-
operative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks [21], dis-
tributed detection in wireless networks [22], sensor networks [23],
services at IoT edge nodes [24], and intrusion detection systems
[1, 25]. Mitigation techniques against Byzantine attacks on con-
sensus algorithms have been proposed mainly for cooperative spec-
trum sensing applications [4, 26–28] and for linear consensus ap-
plications [29–32]. These mitigation techniques are inspired from
outlier detection in machine learning and statistics and model-
based fault-detection in control theory. We have adapted some of
those mitigation techniques to protect the consensus phase of a
NIDS against Byzantine attacks.
3. CONSENSUS BASED NIDS
A consensus based peer-to-peer NIDS is a set of NIDS modules
each placed strategically on a diUerent node of the observed target
network (see Figure 1). An NIDSmodule consists of traXc sensors
that receive copies of all transported packets within the observed
network and calculates an initial local probability for observing
benign or malignant network traXc. Lastly, during the consensus
phase, NIDS nodes aggregate their local observations to come-
up with a common value which is then used to make a network
wide decision as to whether the network is subjected to malicious
activities.
3.1 NIDS Network Representation
The NIDS modules observing local network traXc are them-
selves connected by a network. For the purpose of analysis and
comparisons, we study speciVc topologies of NIDS networks, we
refer to such speciVc network as an NIDS network topology. The
topology of a NIDS network is represented by an undirected graph
G = (V,E)where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vN} denotes the set of NIDS
modules, E denotes the set of edges, we have (vi, vj) ∈ E if and
only if there exists a communication link between nodes vi and
vj in the NIDS network topology. Without lost of generality, we
assume that the links connecting pairs of NIDS modules are direct
physical links. It is also assumed that this network is connected,
though it does not fully connected pairwise all the NIDS mod-
ules. The adjacency matrix A of the graph G is such that aij = 1
if and only if (vi, vj) ∈ E, aij = 0 otherwise. The neighbor-
hood of a node i is deVned as Ni = {vj ∈ V |(vi, vj) ∈ E}, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N . In Figure 1, the NIDS neighbors N2 of node 2 =
{1, 3, 4}, whileN1 = {2}. The degree of a node vi ∈ G, denoted
as di, is deVned as di =
∑n
i=1 aij , i.e. it is the number of edges
in E that have vi as endpoint. The degree matrix D of G is the
diagonal matrix diag(d1, d2, . . . , dN ).
3.2 Network Traffic Analysis and Data Fusion
3.2.1 Likelihood Function
The detection method in the NIDS modules is "anomaly based"
using the well-known naive Bayes classiVer to detect Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, such as Land-attack, Syn-Wood
and UDP-storm. The naive Bayes classiVer assess the statistical
normal behavior - the ’likelihood’ of a set of values to occur - with
help of labeled historic data. The set of features includes most of
the variables oUered by the NLS KDD data set, such as the number
of bytes, service, and number of connections. The probabilities for
an intrusion is computed for each of these m features. P (oj |h)
expresses the likelihood of the occurrence oj given the historic
anomalous ha or normal hn occurrences. Thus, if events receive
the same values than benign or malignant network traXc during
training, they result in a high probability for those. Assuming
conditional independence of our m features, the joint likelihood
P (Oi|h) of NIDSmodule i is the product of all feature likelihoods:
P (Oi|h) =
m∏
j=1
P (oj |h). (1)
Each NIDS module locally assigns the joint likelihood, indicating
the abnormality of each event.
3.2.2 Consensus Phase
Let xi be a variable that represents the state of the NIDS mod-
ule i, and let xi(0) = log(P (Oi|h)) be the initial state of module
i, where xi(0) is the likelihood for module i to see a certain set of
network features (see ’Likelihood Function’). The purpose of the
consensus phase is for each NIDS module to compute the average
sum of theN log-likelihoods: 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(0), while communicat-
ing only with direct neighbors. The value 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(0) is used
by the NIDS modules to come-up collectively with a same deci-
sion about the state of the network wide traXc. The average sum
is computed individually by each module i as a weighted sum of
xi and the xj for j ∈ Ni:
xi(t+ 1) =Wiixi(t) +
∑
j∈Ni
Wijxj(t). (2)
Wij is a weight on edge (vi, vj) that uniformly in-cooperates the
values of each neighbor and exclude peers which are not con-
nected. The iterates of equation (2) is the consensus loop while
xi(t+1) is the consensus value computed by module i at iteration
t + 1. The consensus phase is the computation performed by the
N consensus loops. The consensus phase is formally deVned by
the following computationally equivalent system:
x(t+ 1) =Wx(t) (3)
where x(t) is a vector of N entries denoting the state of the con-
sensus phase at iteration t andW is theweight matrix or consensus
matrix. The entries of x(t) converge to 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(0) as t→∞
provided the weight matrix satisVes some conditions [1]. The
max-degree weight matrix meets these requirements, it is used in
this paper:
Wij =

1
d+1
if j ∈ Ni
1− di
d+1
if i = j
0 if j /∈ Ni
(4)
where d = max(di). The stopping condition of a consensus
loop (also known as ’convergence parameter’) is typically |xi(t)−
xi(t−1)| < . A consensus phase is completed once each consen-
sus loop has met the stopping condition. The number of iterations
of a consensus phase is given by the consensus loop that has the
largest number of iterations. The convergence speed of a consensus
phase is the number of iterations needed by a consensus phase to
complete. The value of  is set such to minimize the number of
iterations during the consensus phase while insuring accuracy of
the decision about the state of the network traXc.
4. DATA FALSIFICATION ATTACKS AND
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
NIDS as well as their sensors are part of the aUected target in-
frastructures, and thus may become targets of attacks which aim
to circumvent or degrade detection capabilities. While central-
ized NIDS may become an information bottleneck and undermine
system performance, peer-to-peer NIDS harbor vulnerabilities in
their information exchange.
4.1 Data Falsification Attacks
Data falsiVcation attacks ultimately try to mask intrusive traf-
Vc to the consensus-based NIDS by degrading the NIDS system
accuracy deVned as TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
, where TP (True Positive)
is the number of attacks detected when it is actually an attack;
TN (True Negative) is the number of normals detected when it
is actually normal; FP (False Positive) is the number of attacks
detected when it is actually normal; FN (False Negative) is the
number of normals detected when it is actually an attack. Accu-
racy is reduced by increasing the number of false positives or false
negatives. To mask currently occurring malicious traXc, data fal-
siVcation attacks could reduce the true probability of attack, here
increasing the number of false negatives. Attackers may also plan
for long term by increasing the number of false positives thus
reducing the reliability of the system in the eyes of the system
administrators.
Data falsiVcation attacks on consensus-based detection algo-
rithms can take the following forms [31]: 1- sensor values are
falsiVed, thus the consensus loop is initialized with values orig-
inating from falsiVed network traXc readings; 2- the consensus
loop iterations are disrupted. In consensus loop disruption, the
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Figure 2: Convergence speeds with and without loop disruption.
simplest case is where attackers ignore the consensus value com-
puted at each iteration and keeps transmitting the same constant
c. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of this attack strategy on the
convergence speed of the consensus phase.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the convergence speed of 1000
consensus phases each having only honest NIDS modules versus a
situation where each consensus phase has one compromised mod-
ule that send the same constant value c to its neighbors. Figure
2 shows that convergence speed is much slower in the compro-
mised system. In this case, modules all converge to c rather than
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(0).
In a second form of consensus loop disruption, the compro-
mised module send to its neighbors a falsiVed consensus value.
This form of loop disruption is modeled in equation (5), which
modiVes the consensus loop in (2) to incorporate this form of at-
tacks:
xi(t+ 1) =Wiixi(t) +
∑
j∈Ni
Wijxj(t) + ui(t). (5)
The consensus value xi(t + 1) is falsVed by adding ui(t) at each
iteration t of the consensus loop. The two mitigation techniques
proposed in this paper address this form of loop disruption attack.
Other attack models, including multiple colluding attackers, are
described in [4, 33].
4.2 Mitigation Techniques
We propose two mitigation techniques that handle consensus
loop disruptions by a single Byzantine attacker. The Vrst one is an
outlier detection procedure associates with each module to evalu-
ate at each consensus loop iteration the potential that a neighbor
of the module is compromised. The second one is an adaptation to
cyber-attacks of a model-based fault-detection technique in pro-
cess engineering and control theory.
4.2.1 Outlier Detection
Outlier detection techniques are commonly applied to detect
data falsiVcation attacks in wireless sensor networks [34]. These
techniques use distance thresholds between the value xj(t) sent
by a neighbor j to node i and some reference value ri. For exam-
ple, if ri(t) = xi(t), neighbor j is Wagged as intruder if |xj(t) −
xi(t)| > λ for some threshold value λ. A unique predeVned
threshold for all nodes may easily be discovered by an intruder.
Furthermore, absolute diUerences |xj(t)−xi(t)| converge to zero
as t → ∞, rendering the outlier detection potentially insensitive
when the absolute diUerences get smaller than λ.
Adaptive thresholds have been proposed to address the above
issues. It consists for each node to compute a localized threshold,
adapting the threshold at each consensus iteration to the reduc-
tion of absolute diUerences |xj(t)− xi(t)|. In [27], the threshold
λi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni |xj(t+ 1)− xi(t+ 1)|∑
j∈Ni |xj(t)− xi(t)|
λi(t) (6)
(for properly initialized λi(0)) is computed by each node i and at
each iteration of the consensus phase. λi(t) partitions neighbors
of node i into two sets, those neighbors j that have a deviation
|xj(t) − xi(t)| ≥ λi(t) are considered suspicious, they consti-
tute the neighborhood NFi of states that have less weight in the
computation of the consensus value xi(t+ 1):
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + 
∑
j∈NTi
xj(t) +

a
∑
j∈NFi
xj(t)
for some constant a. In adaptive local threshold techniques, thresh-
olds are computed using the diUusion dynamics of consensus al-
gorithms, unless attackers can get multi-hops information access,
they cannot foresee the value of their neighbor thresholds, there-
fore they cannot adapt their data falsiVcation function to keep the
values under the radar of the detection procedure. Finally, as the
network converge towards consensus, the value λ converges to-
ward zero, leading to the attackers to be eventually Vlter out.
The outlier detection method we use in this paper computes the
threshold λ as in equation (6). Those neighbors j that have a de-
viation |xj(t)− xi(t)| ≥ λi(t) are Wagged as suspicious. We use
a majority rule similar to [4] to convert the status of a neighbor
NIDS module j from suspicious to attacker. Let B be the num-
ber of common neighbors between module i and module j. If
more then dB
2
e neighbors of module i report j as suspicious then
module j is considered as an attacker, it is disconnected from the
intrusion detection system. Note that we assume a single attacker,
if the majority rule identiVes more than one neighbor as attacker,
the one with the largest deviation is disconnected.
4.2.2 Model-based Fault Detection
Fault detection is a Veld of control engineering concerned with
identifying and locating faults in a system. Methods in this Veld
essentially compare measurements of the actual behavior of a
system with its anticipated behavior. In model-based fault de-
tection, the anticipated behavior is described using mathemati-
cal models [5], the measured system variables are compared with
their model estimates. Comparisons between the system and the
model show deviations when there is a fault in the real system.
Such diUerence between the system and its model is called resid-
ual or residual vector. There exist several implementations of the
model-based approach, the observer-based technique [35] 1- seeks
to discriminate between deviations caused by faults in the real
process from those caused by the estimations (which is why it
is also called a "Vlter"); 2- provides a residual vector that indi-
cates the faulty system component (so called directional residual).
Observer-based fault detection approaches have been applied to
detect cyber-attacks [29, 30, 32].
To detect Byzantine attacks on the intrusion detection system,
a loop parallel to the consensus loop, the observer, is added to
each NIDS module. The observer loop computes a state vector
xo(t) estimating x(t). The deVnition of the observer requires in-
put from the consensus loop. First, we model the consensus loop
disruption attack of equation (5) in matrix form:
x(t+ 1) =Wx(t) + INu(t) (7)
where IN is theN -dimension identity matrix, and where ui(t) =
0 whenever module i behave normally. The consensus loop for a
given module i is now deVned as follow:
x(t+ 1) =Wx(t) + INu(t)
yi(t) = Cix(t)
(8)
where Ci is a (degi + 1)×N matrix in which entry Ci[k, l] = 1
if l ∈ Ni, otherwise Ci[k, l] = 0. The vector yi(t) has (degi + 1)
entries, each entry j of yi(t) stores the state xj(t) at time t of
modules j ∈ Ni. yi(t) is part of the deVnition of the observer.
Note, each NIDS module i knows the consensus matrix W and
the matrix Ci. However, the set of non-zero ui is unknown to the
non-malicious modules.
To detect a malicious neighbor of module i, an observer of the
consensus sub-system (8) is deVned as follow [36]:
z(t+ 1) = (W +GCi)z(t)−Gyi(t)
xo(t) = Lz(t) +Kyi(l)
(9)
where z(t) is the state of the observer and xo(t) is the estima-
tion by the observer of module i of the consensus state x(t). The
matrices to compute z(t + 1) and xo(t) are deVned as follow:
G = −WNi , K = CTi , L = IN − KCi, where WNi are the
columns ofW with indexes in Ni. Analysis of this system in its
full generality is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, we re-
fer to [35] for an historical development and analysis of observer-
based fault detection systems. The analysis of (9) can be simpliVed
as the consensus system (8) satisVes some conditions [29]. It can
be show that as t → ∞, xo(t) → x(t), consequently the estima-
tion error e(t) = xo(t)− x(t) converges to 0. We have
xoj (t) =
{
xj(t) if j = i or j ∈ Ni
zj(t) otherwise
(10)
The state of the observer z(t+1) can be expressed in terms of the
consensus matrix [36]:
z(t+ 1) =Wxo(t). (11)
The iteration error ε(t):
ε(t) = |xo(t+ 1)−Wxo(t)|
can then be used as residual vector. From (10) and (11), εj(t) = 0
for j 6= i and j 6∈ Ni. If εj(t) 6= 0, either xoj (t) 6= xj(t) (esti-
mation error is greater than 0), or uj 6= 0. Since the estimation
error dissipates as t → ∞, we have (xo(t + 1) − Wxo(t)) →
INu(t) as t → ∞. If uj 6= 0 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , N} then
(xoj (t + 1) −Wxoj (t)) → uj(t), the corresponding module j is
detected as an Byzantine attacker.
The observer deVned in (9) is run in parallel with the itera-
tions of the consensus loop of each module i. Together with the
consensus loop in (8), it provides an algorithm to detect Byzan-
tine attacks at the level of each NIDS. Each module i build a
consensus system and an observer as described in equations (8)
and (9). At each consensus iteration, each module i computes
ε(t) = |xo(t + 1) −Wxo(t)|. If εj(t) 6= 0 then module j ∈ Ni
is compromised, and should be isolated from the other modules of
the intrusion detection system.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We have implemented the above two mitigation techniques as
part of the system described in [1]. Tests are performed with four
diUerent NIDS network topology simulations: rings, 2-dimensional
torus with 9 and 25 NIDS modules, Petersen graph (10 nodes 15
edges) and several random graphs having the same number of ver-
tices and edges as in the Petersen graph (the conVguration of an
NIDS network, such as topology and number of nodes, impacts
some aspects of the consensus phase, we hypothesized it will be
the case as well for the detection of Byzantine attacks). Each test
consists of 1000 iterations of the above NIDS networks. In one test
iteration, each NIDS module reads the local network traXc from
one entry of the KDD data set, analyzes the local traXc, then exe-
cutes its consensus loop. The analysis of the local network traXc
returns two values: pa the probability that the observed traXc is
intrusive; pn the probability the observed traXc is normal. Dur-
ing the consensus phase, each module compute
∑N
i=1 log(pai )
N
and∑N
i=1 log(pni )
N
. In tests with the outlier method, each module exe-
cute the following consensus loop:
xai (t+ 1) =Wiix
a
i (t) +
∑
j∈Ni
Wijx
a
j (t) + ui(t) (12)
xni (t+ 1) =Wiix
n
i (t) +
∑
j∈Ni
Wijx
n
j (t) + ui(t). (13)
In tests with the fault detection method, each module execute the
following consensus loop:
xa(t+ 1) =Wxa(t) + Iua
yai (t) = Cix
a(t)
(14)
xn(t+ 1) =Wxn(t) + Iun
yni (t) = Cix
n(t).
(15)
The n-dimensional vectors xa(0) and xn(0) are initialized respec-
tively as xai (0) = log(pai) and x
n
i (0) = log(pni), for i = 1..n.
The observer loop of the fault detection method is identical to the
system described in (9). In all cases, the decision to raise an alert
is based on the ratio of the system wide consensus values pa
pn
and
some predeVned alert value. We have Vltered attacks in NSL-KDD
data set to retain only denial of service attacks.
Attacks inject positive values in the consensus loop component
(12) or (14), thus increasing the number of false positives. At each
iteration of a test, a to be compromised NIDS module j is selected
randomly, uaj is then assigned with a positive value. The mag-
nitude of uaj has to be large enough to falsify the decision at the
end of the consensus phase (i.e. raise an alert when traXc is nor-
mal), if not detected. For example, uaj = 0.0005 is to small, it
does not have an impact on the decision. However, a value such
as uaj = 0.5 can cause the system to converge on a value diUerent
enough from 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(0) such to have an impact on the system
decision. Having uaj = 0.5 is also suitable to obtain meaningful
test results. The values pai and pni returned by the Bayesian anal-
ysis of a module i are the product of likelihoods
∏m
j=1 P (oj |h),
as the number of features is large, the product of likelihoods are
very small. During the consensus phase, neighbor NIDS mod-
ules exchange log-likelihoods, which are in ranges between -20
and -55. So uaj = 0.5 is a relativity small external input to the
consensus phase. It is large enough so that our two mitigation
techniques always detect an attack, but failing to detect it soon
enough can lead the consensus phase to converge to values quite
diUerent from 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(0).
In the following, we Vrst evaluate the computational cost of
running each of the two mitigation techniques. Subsidiary, we
also report the number of consensus iterations needed to detect
an Byzantine attack. Next we analyze the eXciency of the mitiga-
tion techniques to prevent the occurrence of false positives at the
conclusion of a consensus phase.
Table 1 reports the computational cost of running each mitiga-
tion technique. The tests are executed while no attack take place.
The column "Cost" reports the time in milliseconds for running
the NIDS network simulation during 1000 iterations. In Table
1, rows "no detection" give the cost of running a NIDS network
topology without the execution of any detection code. Rows "out-
lier" and "fault" give the cost of running NIDS modules while also
executing respectively the code for the outlier method and the
fault method. The higher costs of the mitigation techniques com-
pared to "no detection" for the same network size and topology
reWects the cost for protecting the NIDS with each of the mitiga-
tion techniques. Table 1 shows that the computational overhead
for outlier is clearly less than for the fault detection method.
Table 1: Computational cost of the mitigation techniques.
Topology Size Detection Cost
Ring
9
no detection 0.050
outlier 0.276
fault 0.921
25
no detection 0.101
outlier 1.131
fault 3.286
Torus
9
no detection 0.027
outlier 0.121
fault 1.327
25
no detection 0.043
outlier 0.567
fault 6.055
Petersen 10
no detection 0.005
outlier 0.135
fault 0.597
Random 10
no detection 0.013
outlier 0.290
fault 1.268
Figures 3 to 8 analyze the detection speed of each mitigation
technique. The detection speed is the number of consensus itera-
tions executed before an Byzantine attack is discovered and elimi-
nated. The analysis is performed for the diUerent network topolo-
gies. The values on the x axis are the number of consensus itera-
tions needed to detect the Byzantine attacker. The y axis displays
the percentage of the 1000 tests that needed a given number of
consensus iterations to detect the attacker. These Vgures clearly
show that the fault detection approach needs fewer iterations to
detect and terminate Byzantine attacks. Comparing with the com-
putational cost in Table 1, the outlier method has a more favor-
able computational overhead but requires more iterations to de-
tect intruders. Note that the detection speed of the fault detection
method depends on the capacity to discriminate iteration error
|xo(t+1)−Wx0(t)| caused by an estimation error xo(t)− x(t)
and caused by external inputs. A minor improvement here will
consist of using outlier methods to identify the intruder. Increas-
ing the magnitude of uaj beyond 0.5 increases the magnitude of the
iteration error vector entry |xo(t+1)−Wx0(t)| corresponding to
the attacker compared to entries impacted only by estimation er-
rors, which can be detected by an outlier method. Conversely, im-
proving convergence speed of the estimation error xo(t)−x(t) to-
wards zero can help to Wag the attacker as outlier. This will avoid
to wait for the convergence of (xo(t+ 1)−Wxo(t))→ INu(t),
where INu(t) is the attack vector.
Figure 3: Detection speed of ring topology 9 nodes.
Figure 4: Detection speed of ring topology 25 nodes.
Figure 5: Detection speed of torus topology 9 nodes.
Attacks have an impact on the accuracy of the decision made by
the NIDS about the state of the network traXc. Table 2 measures
the eUectiveness of the mitigation techniques to maintain the ac-
curacy of the NIDS. The "no attack" rows report the accuracy of
the NIDS system when no attack occur. The "no detection" rows
report the accuracy of the NIDS when attacks take place and the
NIDS is not protected. The "outlier" and "fault" rows report re-
spectively the accuracy of NIDS protected by the outlier and fault
detection methods. We see that even with protections, there are
still some decisions that are not accurate. While Byzantine attacks
are always detected and the compromised modules removed, the
attacker may still have an impact on the decision if it takes too
long for the mitigation technique to detect the intruder. From Vg-
ures 3 to 8, we see that the outlier method needs more iterations
Figure 6: Detection speed of torus topology 25 nodes.
Figure 7: Detection speed of Petersen graph.
Figure 8: Detection speed of Random graphs.
to detect an intruder. In Table 2, the outlier method reports gen-
erally a greater number of FPs.
6. CONCLUSION
Local computation of consensus-based distributed applications
can be hacked by Byzantine attackers falsifying computed consen-
sus information. Several solutions have been proposed in the liter-
ature that address Byzantine attacks on consensus algorithms. We
have adapted two of these solutions, one from model-based fault
detection and one from outlier detection to protect a consensus-
based network intrusion detection system. Results show that each
approach can be used to detect consensus loop disruptions and
prevent falsiVcations of NIDS network traXc assessments. Though
preliminary, our results also show signiVcant computational costs
of these approaches either in terms of the number of iterations to
Table 2: Accuracy of the NIDS.
Topology Size Mitigation TP TN FP FN
Ring
9
no attack 466 520 14 0
no detection 521 0 479 0
outlier 522 404 74 0
fault 456 525 4 15
25
no attack 527 473 0 0
no detection 475 0 525 0
outlier 497 503 58 0
fault 506 489 0 5
Torus
9
no attack 493 491 16 0
no detection 499 0 501 0
outlier 495 438 67 0
fault 478 511 0 11
25
no attack 492 507 1 0
no detection 497 0 503 0
outlier 491 456 53 0
fault 518 450 32 0
Petersen 10
no attack 501 487 12 0
no detection 481 0 519 0
outlier 477 458 65 0
fault 481 516 0 3
Random 10
no attack 451 533 16 0
no detection 485 0 515 0
outlier 503 432 65 0
fault 526 464 0 10
detect attacks (outlier detection) or in terms of the computational
cost of each iteration (model-based detection). This might raise
issues for deploying consensus-based NIDS in suitable environ-
ments such as wireless ad hoc networks.
The work we have presented can be extended to dynamic NIDS
network topologies where NIDS modules and network links en-
ter and leave the network dynamically. Dynamically conVgurable
consensus algorithms have been analyzed recently in the control
theory literature. Such research should provide ways to cut at-
tackers from the network while satisfying the mathematical as-
sumptions requested during the consensus phase.
Finally, this work could be extended to other attack scenarios
such a multiple Byzantine attackers. Model-based fault detection
approaches for multiple Byzantine attackers have been proposed,
but their computational cost is high, likely not adaptable in prac-
tice to NIDSs. Nonetheless, the precision and mathematical foun-
dations of model-based fault detection are quite attractive, funda-
mental research and optimization of current techniques may lead
to lowering their computational cost. Outlier detection methods
are seeing in the literature as eUective approaches to address so-
phisticated attack scenarios. Experimentation seem the more ap-
propriate path to evaluate the true value and challenges of outlier
detection methods in the context of NIDSs.
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